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Abstract 
We challenge a common presumption that poison pills and two Delaware case rulings in 
1995 validating such pills materially entrench firms.  Based on unsolicited takeover 
attempts from 1985 to 2009, we find that poison pills enhance takeover premiums, but do 
not reduce completion rates.  Furthermore, the 1995 Delaware rulings affected neither the 
use of poison pills among the targets, the effectiveness of the pills that were used, the 
completion rate of the takeover attempts, nor the takeover premiums.   
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1. Introduction 
 Two landmark Delaware Supreme Court rulings in 1985 have played significant roles in 
corporate control contests during the ensuing decades.  In the first case, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa 
Petroleum Co., the Delaware Supreme Court established guidelines for what constitutes a 
legitimate response to a perceived takeover threat by the target’s Board of Directors.  To justify 
its defensive measures under the Unocal standard, the target’s Board must show that (1) it had a 
reasonable basis to believe that a legitimate threat to the corporation existed, and (2) its response 
is reasonable in relation to the threat posed.  Thus, the Unocal ruling enhanced the level of 
scrutiny placed on defensive measures beyond the protections afforded by the business judgment 
rule to also include the potential for a judicial review.  In the second case, Moran v. Household 
International Inc., the Delaware Supreme court validated the use of a poison pill plan as a 
legitimate response to a takeover bid under the Unocal standard.  This triggered a surge in 
adoptions of poison pill plans and permanently altered the takeover landscape.  For example, 
Ryngaert (1989) reports an 850% increase in poison pill plans between the court ruling and the 
end of 1986.  
  Since the Moran v. Household ruling, courts applying Delaware law have validated 
numerous other poison pills under the Unocal standard.  The two cases that have attracted the 
most attention among finance researchers were both concluded in 1995, namely Unitrin, Inc. v. 
American General Corp. and Moore Corp. v. Wallace Computer Services, Inc. (hereafter, the 
“1995 Delaware rulings”).  Indeed, in the search for a solution to the pervasive endogeneity 
problem in research on governance, a growing body of literature singles out the 1995 Delaware 
rulings as an exogenous shock that unexpectedly and effectively insulated managers of 
Delaware-incorporated firms from the market for corporate control.  As such, the rulings have 
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been used as an instrument to study the effect of managerial entrenchment on corporate behavior.  
For example, empirical studies report that, after 1995, Delaware firms exhibit decreases in 
employee ownership within defined contribution plans (Rauh, 2006), risk (Low, 2009), and credit 
lines (Yun, 2009), and increases in cash holdings (Yun, 2009) and executive compensation 
(Bereskin and Cicero, 2013), all of which have been attributed to enhanced managerial 
entrenchment. 
 In this study, we dispute the use of the 1995 Delaware rulings as an exogenous 
entrenchment shock for several reasons.  We outline the reasons here and discuss them in detail 
in the next section.  First, the Moran v. Household and other rulings had already paved the way 
for the use of poison pills.  Second, any effect of the 1995 Delaware rulings likely extend beyond 
the state of Delaware, rendering difference-in-difference tests based on Delaware and non-
Delaware firms invalid.  In this regard, it is also relevant that one of the 1995 Delaware rulings 
was actually a Federal court ruling on Delaware law, and it would not be binding for later 
Delaware court cases.  Third, there is no extant evidence that Delaware firms became more 
entrenched after 1995.  Fourth, there is no convincing evidence that the poison pills that the 1995 
rulings validated are associated with entrenchment. 
Our study directly tests whether the 1995 Delaware rulings had any significant and lasting 
effect.  To do so, we examine hostile takeover attempts from 1985 to 2009, with a particular 
emphasis on the use of poison pills among the targets.  Comment and Schwert’s (1995) sample 
ends in 1991, so the lack of a deterrent effect from poison pills that they demonstrate might not 
extend to the post-1995 environment.  Heron and Lie’s (2006) sample covers the period from 
1985 through 1998, thus primarily before the 1995 rulings, and they do not examine whether the 
results vary across time.  We are interested in examining whether targets of hostile takeovers are 
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more likely to adopt poison pills after the 1995 Delaware rulings, whether the rulings generally 
altered the outcomes of the hostile takeover attempts, and whether poison pills adopted after the 
rulings were more effective in thwarting takeovers or extracting higher premiums from the 
bidders. 
As noted earlier, it is unclear whether any effect from the 1995 Delaware rulings pertains 
to only Delaware firms or all US firms.  But what is clear is that studies using the rulings as an 
exogenous shock presume that there is an effect and that the effect is significantly stronger for 
Delaware firms.  Thus, we design our tests primarily to gauge whether the rulings affected 
Delaware firms.  However, our research design also allows us to examine whether the rulings 
had a broader effect, with the important caveat that tests for a broader effect from the rulings 
might be influenced by unrelated time-variant effects.   
In our initial test, we document that, relative to non-Delaware firms, Delaware firms were 
no less likely to be targeted in hostile takeover attempts after than before 1995.  Thus, there is no 
evidence to suggest that the 1995 Delaware rulings contributed to keeping hostile suitors at bay.  
Next, we examine the determinants of poison pill adoptions among target firms.  
Consistent with Heron and Lie (2006), the most important determinant is insider ownership.  In 
particular, firms that have low insider ownership, and, thus, presumably are more vulnerable to 
hostile takeover attempts, are more likely to adopt poison pills.  More importantly for the 
purposes of our study, we find no evidence that target firms are more likely to employ poison 
pills after the 1995 Delaware rulings, regardless of whether the firms are incorporated in 
Delaware.  Thus, the rulings did not spur an increase in the use of poison pills to cope with 
potential hostile bidders.  
 Even if the 1995 Delaware rulings had no effect on the frequency with which targets use 
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pills, the rulings could alter the effectiveness of those pills or have a broader effect irrespective 
of whether pills are used.  Thus, we carefully examine the outcome of the takeover attempts.  We 
find that a takeover attempt is more likely to succeed if the bidder increases the bid beyond the 
initial bid, such that the final bid is comparatively high.  We also find that a bidder is less likely 
to succeed when there are competing bidders, but that the probability that the target will be 
acquired is higher when there are multiple bidders.  However, regardless of whether the takeover 
attempts occur after 1995, the target is incorporated in Delaware, or both, the outcome is similar, 
and poison pills do not significantly affect the probability of success for a bidder or the 
probability that the target is acquired by any bidder. 
 We further find that multiple bidders are associated with greater bid increases during the 
contest, which in turn result in higher final premiums.  Also, consistent with Heron and Lie 
(2006), poison pills induce greater final takeover premiums, mostly as a result of bid increases 
after the initial bid.  But the 1995 Delaware rulings have no general effect on the takeover 
premiums (although there is a slight decline in premiums after 1995 that is hard to attribute to 
the rulings), nor do they alter the effect that poison pills have on the takeover premiums.  
 Overall, we find no evidence that the 1995 Delaware rulings had any effect on hostile 
takeover activity or outcomes, either via the poison pills that the rulings address, or more 
generally.  On this basis, we argue that the rulings had a trivial effect on firm entrenchment and 
cannot be used as an exogenous entrenchment shock to infer the consequences of entrenchment 
on corporate behavior.  In this regard, our study joins an emerging literature (e.g., Atanasov and 
Black (2015a) and Atanasov and Black (2015b)) that questions some of the causal inferences 
from the use of exogenous shocks to examine corporate governance issues.  Nonetheless, we 
remain guarded in interpreting the published evidence on the effect of the 1995 Delaware rulings 
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other than to say that there is no evidence that any observed changes in behavior among Delaware 
firms around 1995 are attributable to increased entrenchment.1   
 
2. The 1995 Delaware rulings as an exogenous entrenchment shock 
In 1985, a few years after the introduction of poison pills, the Moran v. Household ruling 
validated the use of poison pills to defend against coercive bids.  But the Delaware courts (and 
other courts) have subsequently made numerous important rulings on poison pills or closely 
related matters.  We discuss some of these rulings here.  The cases leading up to the 1995 
Delaware rulings are particularly relevant for the argument that the 1995 rulings represent an 
exogenous entrenchment shock. 
In 1988 in City Capital Associates Ltd. v. Interco Inc., the Delaware Chancery Court 
established that “[e]ven where an offer is noncoercive, it may represent a ‘threat’ to shareholder 
interests.”  Yet, “in the setting of a noncoercive offer, absent unusual facts, there may come a 
time when a board's fiduciary duty will require it to redeem the rights and to permit the 
shareholders to choose.”  That is, once the board “has taken such time as it required in good faith 
to arrange an alternative value-maximizing transaction, then, in most instances, the legitimate 
role of the poison pill in the context of a noncoercive offer will have been fully satisfied.”  The 
court ruled that the tender offer posed a mild threat and did not justify the pill, despite the board’s 
belief that the offer was inadequate. 
                                                 
1 While we are interested primarily in whether or not the collective evidence supports the interpretation that the 
1995 Delaware Court rulings were truly watershed events that effectively insulated managers from unwanted 
takeovers and we are not proposing alternative explanations at this point, it is worth noting that overall economic 
conditions improved substantially from 1994 to 1995.  For instance, throughout 1994 the economy was beginning 
to improve rapidly, prompting the Federal Reserve to double the Federal Funds Rate from 3% at the start of 1994 to 
6% by early 1995.  The return on the S&P 500 (including dividends) rose from 1.32% in 1994 to 37.58% in 1995 
and continued to exceed 20% every year through 1999.  Variations in economic factors across states and time 
inevitably affect corporate decisions and behavior in systematic manners. 
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A year thereafter in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., the Delaware 
Supreme Court criticized the lower court’s Interco ruling.  The Supreme Court explicitly rejected 
an application of the Unocal standard that “would involve the court in substituting its judgment 
as to what is a ‘better’ deal for that of a corporation’s board of directors.”  The court further 
recognized substantive coercion – “the risk that shareholders will mistakenly accept an 
underpriced offer because they disbelieve management's representations of intrinsic value” – as 
a threat. Thus, although the court’s ruling did not directly address poison pills, it had significant 
implications for poison pill jurisprudence.  That is, the ruling suggested that boards can adopt 
poison pills to reject indefinitely any bid, as long as the board believes that the firm’s strategy 
eventually will produce greater value than the bid. 
Then we get to the two cases in 1995.  In Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 
American General Corp. tendered an offer for a controlling interest in Unitrin Inc.  The Unitrin 
Board of Directors viewed American General’s takeover offer to be inadequate, and, 
consequently, adopted a poison pill and offered to conduct a stock repurchase to increase the 
board of directors’ ownership from 23% to 28%.  The trial court viewed the takeover offer to be 
a threat of substantive coercion and ruled that the poison pill was a reasonable response.  But it 
also ruled that the repurchase was disproportionate because the pill was already in place.  The 
Delaware Supreme Court overturned the trial court’s ruling on the repurchase, holding that the 
trial court “erred by substituting its judgment, that the Repurchase Program was unnecessary, for 
that of the board.” 
In Moore Corp. Ltd. v. Wallace Computer Services, Inc., Moore launched a tender offer 
for Wallace Computer Services at a 45% premium above the market price.  Although more than 
70% of Wallace shares were tendered, Wallace’s poison pill prevented the completion of the 
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offer.  Moore was successful in replacing one-third of Wallace’s staggered board via a proxy 
fight, but it would take at least another year and successful proxy contest to gain the board 
majority.  Despite the apparent support from Wallace’s shareholders, Moore’s hostile takeover 
attempt was unsuccessful.2  Because Wallace was a Canadian corporation while Moore was 
incorporated in Delaware, the Federal District Court was deemed to be the appropriate 
jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship.3  The Federal District Court, interpreting and 
applying Delaware law, found that “the Moore tender offer pose[d] a threat to Wallace that 
shareholders, because they are uninformed, will cash out before realizing the fruits of the 
substantial technological innovations achieved by Wallace," and that the board response was 
reasonable, even in conjunction with the staggered board, because the pill would not impair the 
likelihood of success in a proxy fight.  
There have also been several recent validations of poison pills.  In 2010 in Selectica, Inc. 
v. Versata Enterprises, Inc., the Delaware court allowed the use of poison pills to protect valuable 
corporate assets, in this case net operating losses (NOLs).  In the same year in Yucaipa American 
Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, the court permitted a pill that grandfathered in a higher 
ownership stake than the pill threshold.  In 2011 in Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas 
Inc., the Delaware court validated a poison pill plan on the basis of the threat posed by an 
“inadequate offer price,” even after Air Products (the suitor) waged a successful proxy contest to 
gain control of one third of the target’s board of directors.4  While waiting for this ruling, the 
                                                 
2 Moore Corporation successfully acquired Wallace Computer in a friendly acquisition in 2003. 
3 Diversity of citizenship is codified in 28 U.S. Code § 1332. 
4 The Air Products v. Airgas case also illustrates the effect of staggered boards in takeover contests involving poison 
pills.  In particular, the staggered board limited Air Products to 1/3 of the board seats via the proxy fight, so it would 
effectively take at least two separate board elections to gain board control.  But once they gained access to additional 
information and performed their due diligence in their role as Airgas Board members, all three directors that Air 
Products placed on the board concluded that the Air Products offer was inadequate and that Airgas should maintain 
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Wall Street Journal wrote on January 18, 2011, that “Corporate attorneys are calling it one of the 
most significant legal decisions in a generation, one that could affect the balance of power 
between boards and shareholders.”  Finally, in 2014 in Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, et al., the 
Delaware court validated a poison pill that discriminated against activist investors.5   
We dispute the use of the 1995 Delaware rulings as an exogenous entrenchment shock 
for four major reasons.  First, the Moran v. Household ruling had already paved the way for the 
use of poison pills, leaving subsequent rulings with a smaller effect on managerial entrenchment.  
And, there are many other Delaware rulings that arguably are at least as significant as the 1995 
Delaware rulings.  Our reading of recent court rulings and conversations with corporate lawyers 
support this view.  For example, the conclusion of Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas 
Inc. ruling states that “The mechanisms in place to get around the poison pill—even a poison pill 
in combination with a staggered board, which no doubt makes the process prohibitively more 
difficult—have been in place since 1985, when the Delaware Supreme Court first decided to 
uphold the pill as a legal defense to an unwanted bid.  That is the current state of Delaware law 
until the Supreme Court changes it.”6  It is also of interest here that the 153-page ruling did not 
cite the Moore Corp. Ltd. v. Wallace Computer Services, Inc. Federal Court ruling even once, 
even though both cases involved a staggered board.  While the Federal Court in Moore Corp. 
Ltd. v. Wallace Computer Services, Inc. was required to interpret and apply Delaware law, its 
ruling does not bind Delaware courts in applying Delaware law. 
                                                 
its poison pill plan.  Thus, Air Products lost all of the ground gained from the seemingly successful election of their 
chosen directors. 
5 The poison pill plan of auction house Sotheby’s set the ownership limits of activist investors and passive investors 
to 10% and 20%, respectively.  Hedge fund mogul Dan Loeb and his firm Third Point challenged this plan on the 
grounds that it unfairly impeded the ability to wage a campaign against Sotheby’s.  But in a ruling from May 2014, 
a Delaware Court of Chancery judge blocked efforts to remove the plan. 
6 Air Products and Chemicals Inc. v. Airgas, Inc. (Del. Ch., CA No. 5249-CC), page 153. 
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Second, studies that use the rulings as an exogenous shock rely on the presumption that 
the entrenchment effect is largely limited to Delaware firms, and, thus, use difference-in-
difference tests to infer causation.  However, because of the sophistication and influence of the 
Delaware courts, their decisions often form persuasive legal precedents for other states as well.  
Indeed, Cremers and Ferrell (2014) point out that “Delaware corporate law decisions have a 
leading role in shaping corporate law in all other states, affecting expectations about legal 
decisions concerning firms incorporated in other states” (pp. 1169-1170).  If Delaware court 
rulings have a nationwide effect, their effect is difficult to disentangle from other time-variant 
effects, and difference-in-difference tests based on Delaware and non-Delaware firms over time 
are inappropriate.   
Third, we are unaware of large-scale empirical evidence that Delaware-incorporated 
firms (or firms in general) became significantly more entrenched after 1995.  Instead, Kaplan and 
Minton (2012) find that CEO turnover has increased in recent years, which is inconsistent with 
the notion of greater managerial entrenchment.  The motivation for using the 1995 rulings 
appears to trace back to Subramanian (2004).  Subramanian mentions the 1995 Delaware rulings 
among several possible explanations for the disappearance of the so-called “Delaware effect” – 
i.e., the superior value of firms in Delaware – as reported by Daines (2001).  But Subramanian 
also shows that the Delaware effect only existed for small firms, representing a measly two 
percent of total market capitalization.  And even Subramanian offers no evidence that the 1995 
Delaware rulings affected managerial entrenchment. 
Fourth, extant literature offers no convincing evidence that the poison pills that the 1995 
Delaware rulings validated are associated with managerial entrenchment.  Early studies of poison 
pill plans (Malatesta and Walkling, 1988; Ryngaert, 1988) report negative abnormal returns upon 
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pill adoptions, which are often interpreted as evidence that poison pill plans entrench 
management.  However, Comment and Schwert (1995) challenge the interpretation of abnormal 
returns upon poison pill adoptions, arguing that the market reaction might contain information 
about imminent or ongoing takeover attempts.  They further speculate that “the market 
misestimated the eventual effect of pills and laws, over-estimating the costs of deterrence and 
underestimating the benefits of added bargaining power” (p. 38).  To provide more direct 
evidence on the effect of poison pills, Comment and Schwert relate the use of poison pills to 
takeover rates from 1975 to 1991.  Their tests show that poison pills did not materially alter 
takeover likelihood, but did contribute to higher gains in successful takeovers.  More recently, 
Heron and Lie (2006) examine the effects of poison pill plans in unsolicited takeover attempts 
and find that poison pills contribute to higher premiums offered to target shareholders, yet do not 
materially alter the likelihood of acquisition success.  Ryngaert and Scholten (2010) examine the 
entrenchment issue by contrasting shareholder wealth outcomes and managerial turnover 
following defeated takeover bids before and after the 1989 Paramount Communications Inc. vs. 
Time Inc. decision, a ruling that is frequently interpreted as validating a “just say no” defense 
against unwanted takeovers.  If the court ruling contributed to increased managerial 
entrenchment, one would expect to find worse shareholder wealth outcomes and reduced 
managerial turnover following defeated takeover bids after the decision vs beforehand.  
However, this is not borne out in the data.  Instead, Ryngaert and Scholten found average contest 
related stock returns and post-offer discounts to be nearly the same for the 1980s and 1990s.7  
With regard to managerial turnover, they find that over the two years subsequent to a defeated 
takeover attempt, the CEOs of targeted firms were more likely to lose their jobs and the targeted 
                                                 
7 In fact, the period that pre-dates the use of poison pills (1980–1984) exhibits the worst shareholder outcomes. 
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firms were just as likely to be subsequently acquired in post Paramount Communications Inc. vs. 
Time Inc. era.  Collectively, their results run counter to the notion that the court ruling bolstered 
managerial entrenchment. 
Lastly, Cain et al. (2014) report that a firm’s probability of being acquired through hostile 
means increased following poison pill validation by law and state statues (although their results 
primarily capture the Moran v. Household decision and they did not consider subsequent 
Delaware rulings).  In sum, there is no direct evidence to suggest that on the whole, poison pills 
entrench managers.  Thus, it is questionable whether any rulings validating pills, including the 
1995 Delaware rulings, served to entrench managers. 
 
3. Sample 
We construct our initial sample of unsolicited acquisition attempts announced between 
1985 and 2009 from the Securities Data Company (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions database.  
We consider takeover attempts that the SDC database classifies to be either hostile or unsolicited.  
We require the sample firms to be covered on CRSP and Compustat so that we can utilize 
financial data and stock trading data in our analysis, and that they have at least one year of stock 
returns available on CRSP over the 250 trading days (approximately one year) prior to the 
announcement of the takeover offer.  Takeover offers that were made when the firms were in the 
midst of a bankruptcy reorganization process are excluded.  We collected information on CEO 
compensation, board composition and structure, and ownership by officers and directors from 
proxy statements immediately preceding the takeover attempts.  The adoption dates for poison 
pills come from searching various editions of the Clark Boardman publication entitled 
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“Corporate Anti-Takeover Defenses: The Poison Pill Device”, Dow Jones News Retrieval / 
Factiva, and FactSet’s SharkRepellent database.   
To ensure that our conclusions are not attributable to extremely small firms and/or 
extreme returns for low-priced stocks, we exclude firms with either assets or equity market values 
less than $10 million and stock prices less than $3 as of 20 days prior to the announcement of the 
takeover offer.  Because takeover premiums play a significant role in our analysis and 
conclusions, we exclude four firms from the final analysis because the windows we use to capture 
takeover premiums included either the 1987 or 2008 stock market crashes.  Prior to controlling 
for multiple unsolicited bids, the sample consists of 694 hostile or unsolicited takeover offers.   
Because of our interest in identifying the extent to which poison pills plans contribute to 
eventual takeover outcomes and shareholder premiums, it is important to properly control for 
multiple bidder contests.  To do so, we first measure premiums offered relative to target firm 
share prices prior to initial bids in multiple bidder contests so that we can isolate how much the 
bidding contests contribute to increased premiums.  We further use an indicator variable to 
identify multiple bidder contests.  In many cases, the competing bidder will be a friendly offer 
that would not otherwise enter our sample, and, if so, our sample design captures this properly 
without double counting through the multiple bidder dummy indicator.  However, there are 
several cases where the offers from competing parties were also classified as unsolicited offers, 
and the outcomes are therefore picked up multiple times in our sample construction, creating a 
potential double-counting situation.  To prevent this type of double-counting from affecting our 
summary statistics and multivariate models, we allow multiple unsolicited bids in a bidding 
contest to enter the sample only once during our statistical analyses by including only one of the 
observations (i.e., the record for the first unsolicited offer) used in combination with a multiple 
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bidder indicator variable.  Thirty-two instances of unsolicited bids in multiple bidder contests 
were removed to prevent double-counting, so the final reported sample consists of 662 takeover 
contests involving unsolicited bids. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the sample.  The mean and median equity 
market values for the targeted firms (as of 20 days prior to the initial announcement) are $1.112 
billion and $191 million, respectively. The mean and median debt ratios are both 56%, which are 
statistically indistinguishable from corresponding figures for industry peers (as determined by 
the median figure for firms in the same Fama-French 48 industry classifications).  The mean cash 
and short term investment ratios of 11.3% exceed the mean of 8.9% for industry peers 
(statistically significant at the 0.01 level), while the median ratio of 5.8% for the sample firms is 
similar to that of 5.7% for industry peers.  The mean (median) market-to-book ratios of 1.36 
(1.15) are significantly lower than those for industry peers of 1.42 (1.31) at the 0.05 (0.01) 
statistical significance level.  The mean and median industry-adjusted operating income before 
depreciation are 2.6% and 1.6% and statistically different from zero at the 0.01 significance level.  
The stock returns for target firms before the takeover attempts tend to be below those for the 
overall stock market (as proxied by the CRSP value-weighted return) and the target firms’ 
industries (as proxied by value-weighting the returns in the same Fama-French 48 industry 
classification).  For instance, the mean (median) stock return for the sample firms during the year 
prior to the takeover attempt is 5.2% (1.9%), compared to that for the overall market of 12.5% 
(16.1%) and the industry of 24.3% (22.2%) over the same interval.  This is consistent with the 
notion that recent poor stock price performance increases the likelihood that a firm will receive 
an unsolicited takeover offer. 
 14 
The mean initial premium offered is 36.4% and the median is 33.3%.  The majority of 
offers are increased relative to the initial offer, with a mean increase of 14.7% and a median 
increase of 8.1%.  Roughly 56% of the targets (369 out of 662) either had a poison pill plan 
already in place (43%) or adopted a morning-after pill (13%) in response to the unsolicited offers.  
Over half of the target firms have staggered terms for the board of directors (51%) and over three-
fifths (62%) have CEOs that also serve as the chairperson of the board.  While only 21% of the 
unsolicited offers are successful, this figure can be misleading in characterizing the resolution of 
takeover attempts, because a significant number of contests have multiple bidders (266 of 662, 
or 40% of the sample), which often culminate with an acquisition, but in many cases by a 
competing bidder.  For example, 187 of the targeted firms (28%) were acquired by competing 
bidders.  Collectively, of the 662 takeover attempts, 325, or 49%, end up with the targeted firm 
either being acquired by the bidder or by a competing bidder.  Thus, failing to properly consider 
the resolution of contests with multiple bidders could give rise to a significant bias toward the 
inference that takeover defenses serve as entrenchment devices and against the inference that 
takeover defenses contribute toward higher takeover premiums. 
 
4. Univariate comparisons 
Table 2 provides univariate comparisons for subsamples based on either the outcome (i.e., 
whether the firm was ultimately acquired by either the bidder or by a competing bidder) or 
whether the targeted firm had a poison pill (either already in place or adopted in response to the 
takeover attempts as a morning-after pill).  There are no significant differences between firms 
that were acquired vs. others in terms of size, debt ratios, market-to-book ratios, use of poison 
pills, staggered boards, and duality of CEO/Chairman of the Board.  Acquired firms tend to have 
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slightly lower insider ownership, reflecting that higher levels of insider ownership helps to 
insulate firms from hostile takeovers.  As expected, the premiums offered are higher for 
successful contests than for unsuccessful contests; the typical initial premium offered is roughly 
4-5% higher for successful contests, and this gap increases to more than 20% when considering 
subsequent premium increases.   
Firms that use poison pills have, on average, a market capitalization of $1.4 billion, about 
double that of other firms, and insider ownership of 9.0%, about half that of other firms.  
Moreover, firms that use poison pill plans have, on average, greater outside board representation 
(62% vs. 55%) and higher industry-adjusted levels of operating performance (3.7% vs. 1.3%).  
Perhaps most interestingly, while the mean initial premium does not differ statistically for firms 
with and without pills (38% vs. 35%), the mean premium increase and the mean total premium 
for firms that use poison pills of 18% and 56%, respectively, are significantly higher than 
comparable means of 11% and 45%, respectively, for firms that do not use poison pills.  This 
shows that, at least on a univariate basis, poison pills are associated with higher total premiums 
resulting from premium increases during the contest. 
Table 3 provides a further decomposition of the sample based on whether the takeover 
attempt was announced after the 1995 Delaware rulings (i.e., 1985–1995 vs. 1996–2009) and 
whether the target is incorporated in the state of Delaware.  The proportion of targeted firms 
incorporated in Delaware increased from 57.5% (226 of 393) through 1995 to 62% (167 of 269) 
in the post 1995 period.  Furthermore, the proportion of Delaware targets that were acquired 
declined from 49.1% to 45.5% from before to after 1995 (a statistically insignificant decline), 
whereas the proportion for non-Delaware targets declined more markedly from 56.3% to 43.1% 
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(a statistically significant decline at the 0.01 level).  On these bases, there is no evidence to 
suggest that Delaware firms became more entrenched after 1995 relative to other firms. 
For Delaware targets, the mean (median) premium declined from 53.7% (45.5%) before 
1995 to 46.0% (40.8%) after 1995, and the p-values for both the mean and the median difference 
are less than 0.05.  The decline in premium over time is slightly more pronounced for non-
Delaware targets; the mean (median) premium is 56.1% (50.8%) before 1995 and 45.6% (43.7%) 
after 1995, and the p-values for both the mean and the median difference are less than 0.01.  The 
proportion of contests with multiple bidders remained constant at about 40% (there was a slight 
increase among Delaware targets and a slight decrease among non-Delaware targets, but none of 
the changes are statistically significant).  Delaware targets are more likely than non-Delaware 
firms to use poison pills (about 60% vs. 50%), and both types of targets exhibit a statistically 
insignificant increase in the use of poison pills from before to after 1995. 
 
5. Multivariate tests 
5.1 The use of poison pills 
In our first multivariate test, we examine the probability that targets use a poison pill plan.  
Table 4 presents a regression of the probability that a poison pill plan is adopted against variables 
designed to capture the effects of the 1995 Delaware rulings and various control variables.  The 
two variables for the 1995 Delaware rulings are (1) a post 1995 dummy that captures the effect 
across all firms, and (2) an interaction between the post 1995 dummy and a Delaware 
incorporation dummy that captures the effect that pertains only to targets incorporated in 
Delaware.  As noted earlier, it is unclear whether the 1995 Delaware rulings affect only Delaware 
firms, and, thus, which of these variables capture the bulk of the effect of the rulings.   
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The coefficient on insider ownership negative, and it is the only coefficient that is 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  The negative coefficient is consistent with Malatesta 
and Walkling (1988) and Heron and Lie (2006), and suggests that firms with sufficiently high 
insider ownership can effectively block unwanted takeovers, whereas firms with low levels of 
insider ownership use poison pills to boost their otherwise low bargaining power.  The coefficient 
on the staggered board variable is significantly positive at the 0.10 level, perhaps reflecting the 
complementarity of poison pills and classified boards as delay tactics in unsolicited takeover 
attempts.   
Neither the coefficient on the post 1995 dummy nor the coefficient on the interaction 
variable between the Delaware and post 1995 variables differs statistically from zero.  Thus, even 
though the 1995 Delaware rulings specifically validated the use of poison pills, they have no 
discernible effect on targets’ use of poison pills, irrespective of whether the targets were 
incorporated in Delaware. 
5.2 Takeover outcomes 
We next turn to our multivariate analysis of takeover outcomes.  Table 5 presents logistic 
regressions of whether the takeover succeeds (model a) and whether the firm is acquired by any 
of the bidders involved (model b).  In model a, the coefficient on the multiple bidder dummy is 
negative and statistically significant, suggesting that an individual unsolicited takeover offer is 
less likely to be successful in the presence of competing bidders.  In model b, the coefficient on 
the multiple bidder dummy turns positive and statistically significant, suggesting that it is more 
likely that the target will be acquired when there is proven interest from multiple parties.  Both 
of these coefficients have the expected signs and highlight the importance of controlling for the 
competition between interested parties when examining the outcome of a takeover contest. 
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As expected, a higher premium increases both the chance that a takeover attempt succeeds 
and that the target is acquired by one of the bidders.  The effect is evident for both parts of the 
total premiums, i.e., the initial premium offered and any premium increases.  But the magnitudes 
of the coefficients suggest that premium increases have a greater impact on the outcome than on 
initial premiums offered.  One implication of these results is that bidders trying to close the deal 
should save part of the initial premium for later premium increases during the bargaining process.  
As earlier, we capture the 1995 Delaware rulings effects via two variables, i.e., a post 
1995 dummy and an interaction between the post 1995 dummy and the Delaware dummy.  If the 
1995 Delaware rulings have a general entrenchment effect, our variables should have negative 
coefficients.  We also examine whether the 1995 Delaware rulings affect the outcome indirectly 
by strengthening the effect of poison pills.  To do so, we interact the same two variables with our 
poison pill variable, and conjecture that the associated coefficients are negative. 
Our results show that neither the coefficient on the post 1995 dummy nor the coefficient 
on the post 1995 dummy interacted with the Delaware dummy is statistically significant.  Thus, 
there is no evidence that the 1995 Delaware rulings entrench firms that are targets of hostile 
takeovers.  The coefficient on the poison pill is not statistically significant either, suggesting that 
poison pills have no detectable effect on takeover likelihood.  Finally, the coefficients on the 
interaction variables – the poison pill dummy interacted with the post 1995 dummy and the 
poison pill dummy interacted with both the post 1995 dummy and the Delaware dummy – are 
not statistically significant.  Thus, there is no evidence that the 1995 Delaware rulings 
strengthened the effect of poison pills.  In fact, there is no evidence in table 5 that poison pills 
had any effect under any regime. 
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5.3 Takeover premiums 
Malatesta and Walkling (1988) discuss in detail two competing hypotheses on the wealth 
effect of takeover defenses.  The entrenchment hypothesis holds that takeover defenses reduce 
stockholder wealth by hindering takeovers.  The previous analysis on pill use and takeover 
outcomes addresses this.  The alternative stockholder interests hypothesis holds that takeover 
defenses allow target firms to secure a higher takeover premium.  As a natural extension to our 
analysis, we therefore examine the determinants of the takeover premiums.  This should provide 
further insights into the bargaining power of the target’s management in negotiating with 
potential suitors.  We are especially interested in testing whether the 1995 Delaware rulings 
directly or indirectly (via poison pills) increased takeover premiums.  
Table 6 presents results from regressions of takeover premiums.  Model a is based on the 
initial premiums offered, model b is based on premium increases, and models c and d are based 
on total premiums (i.e., the sum of the initial premiums and any premium increases). 
The coefficient on multiple bidders is statistically insignificant in model a, but positive 
and statistically significant in models b-d.  Thus, the presence of multiple bidders does not affect 
the initial bid price, but the ensuing bidding war between multiple bidders raises the premiums 
substantially.  In fact, the magnitude of the coefficients suggests that a bidding war results in a 
total premium offered that is 18% higher, on average, than it is in single bidder takeover attempts.  
It is also consistent with the notion that low-ball initial takeover offers often end up attracting 
competing bidders. 
The prior stock return of the target also affects the premium offered.  The coefficient for 
prior stock return is negative and statistically significant across all models (the p-value varies 
from 0.016 in model a for the initial premium offered to less than 0.001 in models c and d for the 
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total premium).  Thus, it appears that firms are willing to offer more, both initially and in the 
form of subsequent price increases, when the target has recently experienced poor stock price 
performance. 
In model a, the coefficients on the existing poison pill indicator variable is 0.042 with a 
p-value of 0.033, suggesting that the initial bid premium is 4.2% higher when the target has a pill 
in place.  In model b, the coefficient on the existing pill variable is 0.050 with a p-value of 0.011, 
suggesting that these pills contribute another 5.0% to the premium via subsequent negotiations, 
for a total contribution to the premium of 4.2% + 5.0% = 9.2%.  In model b, we also include an 
indicator variable for morning-after poison pills that are adopted at some point after the targets 
have been put in play.  The coefficient on this variable is 0.097 (p-value < 0.01), suggesting that 
morning-after pills induce average premium increases of 9.7%.  In sum, the results from models 
a and b suggest that poison pills, irrespective of whether they were in place prior to the takeover 
attempt or adopted in response to the attempt, raised the total premium by a little less than 10%.  
In model c, the coefficient on the poison pill indicator variable (which is the sum of the existing 
and morning-after poison pill indicator variables) is 0.105 with a p-value less than 0.01, 
suggesting that poison pills raise total premiums by 10.5%.  All of our models suggest that poison 
pills benefit the target by extracting a higher premium from the bidder, consistent with Heron 
and Lie (2006). 
Finally, we shift our attention to the effect of the 1995 Delaware rulings.  For brevity, we 
focus on the effect on total premiums offered.  In model c, the coefficient on the post 1995 
dummy is −0.099 with a p-value of 0.015, suggesting that the takeover premiums are lower 
during 1995-2011 than during 1985-1995.  One might argue that the lower premiums since 1995 
are attributable to a general effect from the 1995 Delaware rulings that extends beyond the state 
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of Delaware.  However, we would expect that if the 1995 Delaware rulings truly gave target firms 
more bargaining power, any acquirer would be forced to pay a higher premium.  Thus, we 
interpret this result as inconsistent with the notion that the 1995 Delaware rulings increased the 
bargaining power of target firms.  The coefficient on the interaction between the post 1995 
dummy and the Delaware dummy is statistically insignificant, indicating no discernable effect of 
the 1995 Delaware rulings on takeover premiums among targets in Delaware relative to targets 
in other states.  Lastly, we interact the poison pill dummy with the two variables for the 1995 
Delaware rulings to gauge whether the rulings enhanced the effect of poison pills on takeover 
premiums.  The coefficients on these interaction variables are also statistically insignificant.  In 
sum, we find no evidence that the 1995 Delaware rulings allowed targets to extract a higher 
premium as a result of greater bargaining power, regardless of whether we search for a general 
effect or an indirect effect via the poison pills that the rulings address. 
 
6. Conclusion 
A large portion of the corporate governance literature seeks to determine how corporate 
governance and firm entrenchment affect corporate behavior.  In that regard, multiple governance 
measures, e.g., the GIM and entrenchment indices, have been developed and applied.  However, 
endogeneity concerns hamper inferences in studies that rely on these governance measures.  
Thus, researchers have searched for exogenous shocks that might resolve any endogeneity.  The 
necessary conditions for such shocks are that they are exogenous, unexpected, and induce a 
material change in the governance/entrenchment for an identifiable set of firms.  In this study, 
we focus on two case rulings on poison pills in Delaware in 1995 that have been used as an 
exogenous entrenchment shock.  We believe that these rulings were exogenous to most firms.  
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But it is not clear that they were unexpected in the prevailing legal environment.  And we dispute 
that they materially entrenched firms. 
To gauge the effect of the 1995 Delaware rulings, we undertake a comprehensive study 
of unsolicited takeover attempts spanning a decade before and more than a decade after the 
rulings.  We find no evidence that the 1995 Delaware rulings had any entrenchment effect.  In 
particular, Delaware firms are no less likely to be targeted after 1995.  Furthermore, the rulings 
did not affect the use of poison pills among the targets, the effectiveness of the pills that were 
used, the completion rate of the takeover attempts, or the takeover premiums.  Finally, we find 
no evidence for the common presumption that poison pills entrench firms and, therefore, that 
court cases validating pills, including those in Delaware in 1995, can be used as an entrenchment 
shock.  That is, like Comment and Schwert (1995) and Heron and Lie (2006), we report that the 
use of pills enhances the takeover premium but does not reduce the takeover completion rate. 
Our evidence casts serious doubt on both the use of the 1995 Delaware rulings as an 
exogenous shock and the inferences made by studies that examine the effect of these rulings on 
corporate behavior.  Perhaps the documented effects of the rulings are merely coincidental or 
attributable to omitted factors, leading to the well-known publication bias in academic research 
(Sterling, Rosenbaum, and Weinkam, 1995).  In any event, we caution against relying on the 
1995 Delaware rulings to infer the effect of entrenchment and encourage corporate governance 
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This table presents descriptive statistics for the targets of 662 unsolicited takeover attempts from 1985 to 2009.  Figures 
derived from financial statements are for the fiscal year preceding the announcement of the takeover attempt, unless 
otherwise indicated.  Equity market values are as of 20 days prior to the announcement of the takeover attempt.  Insider 
ownership, CEO compensation, and the Board of Directors data come from the most recent proxy statement prior to the 
announced takeover attempt.  CEO compensation is the sum of the CEO’s salary plus cash bonus for the year prior to the 
takeover announcement.  Industry adjusted OIBD is the paired difference between operating income / assets for the sample 
firm and the median figure for firms in the same Fama-French 48 industry classification.  Stock return for prior year is the 
cumulative stock return over the year ending 20 days prior to the announcement date of the takeover attempt.  Market return 
for prior year is the compounded value-weighted CRSP market return over the year ending 20 days prior to the 
announcement date of the takeover attempt.  Industry return for prior year is the compounded value-weighted return for 
firms in the same Fama-French 48 Industry classification over the year ending 20 days prior to the announcement date of 
the takeover attempt.  Initial premium offered is the initial offer price divided by the price 20 days prior, less one.  Premium 
increase is the percentage increase in the bid price, relative to the price 20 days prior to the initial offer.  Completed offers 
are those that were completed by the unsolicited bidder.   
 
  Mean  Median 
     
 Market value of equity ($ millions) 1,112  191 
 Total liabilities / Assets 0.561  0.565 
 Cash and short-term investments / Assets 0.113  0.058 
 Market-to-book assets 1.36  1.14 
 Insider ownership 0.133  0.083 
 CEO compensation ($ thousands)  669  444 
 Fraction of outside directors 0.588  0.615 
 Industry-adjusted OIBD 0.026  0.016 
 Stock return for prior year 0.052  0.019 
 Market return for prior year 0.125  0.161 
 Industry return for prior year 0.243  0.222 
 Initial premium offered 0.364  0.333 
 Premium increase 0.147  0.081 
     
  Number  Fraction (%) 
     
 Targets with existing poison pills 286  43.2 
 Targets that adopted morning-after pills 83  12.5 
 Staggered board 339  51.2 
 CEO=Chairperson of board 411  62.1 
 Pill and Staggered board 204  30.8 
 Contests with multiple bidders 266  40.2 
 Completed offers 138  20.9 
 Acquired by a competing bidder 187  28.3 





This tables presents descriptive statistics for subsamples based on whether the targeted firms were ultimately acquired and whether the targeted firms employed a poison pill.  Financial 
statement figures are for the fiscal year preceding the announcement of the takeover attempt, unless otherwise indicated.  Equity market values are as of 20 days prior to the announcement 
of the takeover attempt, or the first announcement in a multiple bidder contest.  Insider ownership, CEO compensation, and the Board of Director information come from the proxy 
statement prior to the announced takeover attempt.  CEO compensation is the sum of salary plus cash bonus for the year prior to the takeover announcement.  Industry adjusted OIBD is 
the paired difference between operating income / assets for the sample firm and the median figure for firms in the same Fama-French 48 industry classification.  Stock return for prior year 
is the cumulative stock return over the year ending 20 days prior to the announcement date of the takeover attempt.  Initial premium offered is relative to the price 20 days prior to the 
initial offer.  Premium increase is the percentage increase in the bid price, scaled by the price 20 days prior to the initial offer.  Total premium is the sum of the initial premium and premium 
increase.  In the case of multiple bidders, initial premium offered is based on the initial bid and total premium is based on the final offer, whether successful or not (both scaled by the stock 
price 20 days prior to the initial offer).  * and ** denote that the difference between the subsamples is statistically significant at the 5% and l% levels, respectively. 
 
 Sample partitioned on outcome  Sample partitioned on poison pills 
 Acquired 
(n=325) 
 Unsuccessful offers 
(n=337) 
 Firms with poison pills 
(n=369) 
 Firms w/o poison pills 
(n=293) 
 Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median 
Market value of equity ($ millions) 1,225 227  1,003 157  1,419* 272**  726 104 
Total liabilities / Assets 0.565 0.565  0.557 0.564  0.557 0.563  0.566 0.567 
Cash / Assets 0.101* 0.054  0.125 0.064  0.115 0.057  0.112 0.060 
Market-to-book assets 1.36 1.16  1.36 1.13  1.40 1.20**  1.31 1.09 
Insider ownership 0.124 0.070*  0.142 0.097  0.090** 0.060**  0.188 0.122 
CEO compensation ($ thousands) 685 464  654 418  740* 525**  580 355 
Fraction of outside directors 0.594 0.615  0.581 0.615  0.618** 0.667**  0.550 0.571 
Industry-adjusted OIBD 0.032 0.018  0.021 0.011  0.037** 0.022**  0.013 0.007 
Stock return for prior year 0.061 0.040  0.043 -0.007  0.032 0.000  0.077 0.042 
Initial premium offered (%) 0.382* 0.357*  0.347 0.309  0.379 0.361**  0.345 0.313 
Premium increase (%) 0.241** 0.197**  0.056 0.000  0.177** 0.111**  0.109 0.000 
Total premium (%) 0.623** 0.556**  0.409 0.349  0.557** 0.490**  0.454 0.431 
Existing poison pill 0.449   0.415   0.775     
Morning-after pill 0.142   0.110   0.225     
Staggered board 0.517   0.507   0.553*   0.461  
CEO=Chairperson of board 0.631   0.611   0.650   0.584  
Delaware incorporation 0.575   0.611   0.634*   0.543  
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Table 3 
Unsolicited takeover attempts across time 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics based on whether the offers were made before December 31, 1995 and whether the 
firms were incorporated in Delaware.  Panels A and B present statistics for firms incorporated in Delaware and other states, 
respectively.  Poison Pill is an indicator variables equal to one if the targeted firm had a poison pill defense, either in place 
prior to the takeover contest or adopted as a morning-after pill after the takeover contest began.  Staggered Board is an 
indicator variable equal to one if the target had a staggered board.  * and ** denote statistically significant differences 
between the time periods within the same panel at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  † and †† denote statistically 
significant differences across the panels within the same time period at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  1985-1995  1996-2009  
      
 Panel A: Delaware incorporation     
 Number of observations 226  167  
 Multiple bidders 0.367  0.425  
 Acquired by unsolicited bidder 0.226  0.168  
 Acquired by bidder or a competing bidder 0.491  0.455  
 Premium offered (mean) 0.537 * 0.460  
 Premium offered (median) 0.455 * 0.408  
 Poison Pill 0.589 † 0.605  
 Staggered Board 0.549  0.533  
      
 Panel B: Non-Delaware incorporation     
 Number of observations 167  102  
 Multiple bidders 0.437  0.382  
 Acquired by unsolicited bidder 0.246  0.177  
 Acquired by bidder or a competing bidder 0.563 * 0.431  
 Premium offered (mean) 0.561 ** 0.456  
 Premium offered (median) 0.508 ** 0.437  
 Poison Pill 0.485  0.529  





Probability that a poison pill plan is adopted 
 
This table presents logistic regressions of the probability of the target adopting a poison pill plan.  The dependent variable 
equals one if the targeted firm had a poison pill defense, either in place prior to the takeover contest or adopted as a morning-
after pill after the takeover contest began.  Figures derived from financial statements are for the fiscal year preceding the 
announcement of the takeover attempt, unless otherwise indicated.  Equity market values are as of 20 days prior to the 
announcement of the takeover attempt.  Insider ownership figures represent the fractional ownership of officers and 
directors (taken from proxy statements).  Staggered board is an indicator variable equal to one if the target had a staggered 
board.  CEO compensation is the sum of the CEO's salary plus cash bonus for the year prior to the takeover announcement.  
CEO=Chairperson is an indicator variable equal to one if the target's CEO was also the chairperson of the Board.  Industry 
adjusted OIBD is the paired difference between operating income / assets for the sample firm and the median figure for 
firms within the same Fama-French 48 industry classification.  Stock return for prior year is the cumulative stock return 
over the year ending 20 days prior to the announcement date of the takeover attempt.  Industry-adjusted stock return is the 
difference between the firm’s stock return and the compounded value-weighted return for firms in the same Fama-French 
48 Industry classification over the year ending 20 days prior to the announcement date of the takeover attempt.  The 
likelihood ratio index is defined as [1-(log likelihood at convergence)/(log likelihood at zero)], and is similar to the R2 
statistic for a linear regression. 
 
  Coeff. p-value 
 Intercept -2.621 0.049 
 Log of equity market value 0.122 0.113 
 Total liabilities / Assets -0.689 0.109 
 Market-to-book assets 0.097 0.446 
 Insider ownership -4.889 0.000 
 Staggered board 0.336 0.056 
 Log of CEO compensation 0.115 0.336 
 Fraction of outside directors 0.559 0.237 
 CEO = Chairperson of board 0.072 0.693 
 Industry adjusted OIBD 2.345 0.028 
 Stock return for prior year -0.636 0.081 
 Industry-adjusted stock return  0.565 0.121 
 Delaware 0.467 0.038 
 Post 1995 0.133 0.640 
 Delaware * Post 1995 -0.194 0.593 
    
 N  662 
 Likelihood ratio statistic  119.38 





Probability that the takeover offer succeeds or the target is acquired by any bidder 
 
This table presents logistic regressions of the probability that the unsolicited takeover offer succeeds (model a) or the 
probability that the targeted firm is taken over by any of the bidders (model b).  The dependent variable equals one if the 
unsolicited bidder's takeover attempt succeeded.  Figures derived from financial statements are for the fiscal year preceding 
the announcement of the takeover attempt, unless otherwise indicated.  Equity market values are as of 20 days prior to the 
announcement of the takeover attempt.  Multiple bidders is an indicator variable that equals one if there are competing 
bidders.  Poison pill is an indicator variable equal to one if the target had a poison pill prior to when the outcome of the 
takeover attempt was determined.  Insider ownership figures represent the fractional ownership of officers and directors 
(taken from proxy statements).  Staggered board is an indicator variable equal to one if the target had a staggered board.  
CEO compensation is the sum of the CEO's salary plus cash bonus for the year prior to the takeover announcement.  
CEO=Chairperson is an indicator variable equal to one if the target's CEO was also the chairperson of the Board.  Industry 
adjusted OIBD is the paired difference between operating income / assets for the sample firm and the median figure for 
firms within the same Fama-French 48 industry classification.  Stock return for prior year is the cumulative stock return 
over the year ending 20 days prior to the announcement date of the takeover attempt.  Industry-adjusted stock return is the 
difference between the firm’s stock return and the compounded value-weighted return for firms in the same Fama-French 
48 Industry classification over the year ending 20 days prior to the announcement date of the takeover attempt.  Initial 
premium offered is the initial offer price divided by the price 20 days prior, less one.  Total premium is defined in Table 2.  
The likelihood ratio index is defined as [1-(log likelihood at convergence)/(log likelihood at zero)], and is similar to the R2 
statistic for a linear regression. 
 
  Offer succeeds  Target is acquired 
  (a)  (b) 
  Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value 
 Intercept -3.028 0.049  -3.465 0.017 
 Log of equity market value 0.178 0.043  -0.014 0.874 
 Total liabilities / Assets -0.653 0.218  -0.725 0.159 
 Market-to-book assets 0.131 0.257  0.127 0.298 
 Multiple bidders -0.948 0.000  2.879 0.000 
 Poison pill -0.114 0.766  0.473 0.259 
 Insider ownership -0.606 0.529  -0.397 0.652 
 Staggered board 0.109 0.603  -0.096 0.651 
 Log of CEO compensation -0.065 0.631  0.111 0.367 
 Fraction of outside directors 0.568 0.331  0.611 0.287 
 CEO = Chairperson of board 0.259 0.245  0.199 0.374 
 Industry adjusted OIBD 1.046 0.346  1.570 0.172 
 Stock return for prior year 0.493 0.223  0.189 0.666 
 Industry-adjusted stock return  -0.490 0.415  0.045 0.920 
 Delaware -0.407 0.312  0.230 0.570 
 Post 1995 -0.309 0.523  -0.288 0.553 
 Delaware * Post 1995 -0.073 0.916  -0.515 0.433 
 Poison Pill * Delaware 0.371 0.475  -0.606 0.268 
 Poison Pill * Post 1995 -0.349 0.599  -0.582 0.382 
 Poison Pill * Del. * Post 1995 0.228 0.797  0.942 0.280 
 Initial premium offered (%) 0.711 0.114  1.386 0.004 
 Premium increase (%) 1.641 0.000  3.586 0.000 
       
 N  662   662 
 Likelihood Ratio Statistic  54.96   328.29 




Regressions of takeover premiums 
 
This table presents regressions of the takeover premiums.  The dependent variable in model a is the initial premium scaled 
by the target's price 20 days prior to the initial offer.  The dependent variable in model b is the premium increase in 
percentage.  The dependent variable in models c and d is the total percentage premium (initial premium plus any premium 
increase) offered (relative to the target's price 20 days prior to the initial offer).  In the case of multiple bidders, the initial 
premium offered is based on the initial bid and premium increase and total premium are based on the final offer, whether 
successful or not (both scaled by the stock price 20 days prior to the initial offer).  Figures derived from financial statements 
are for the fiscal year preceding the announcement of the takeover attempt, unless otherwise indicated.  Equity market 
values are as of 20 days prior to the announcement of the takeover attempt.  Multiple bidders is an indicator variable that 
equals one if there are competing bidders.  Existing poison pill is an indicator variable equal to one if the target had a poison 
pill prior to when the takeover attempt was announced.  Morning-after pill is an indicator variable that equals one if the 
targeted firm adopted a poison pill after the takeover attempt was announced, but before the outcome was determined.  
Poison pill is an indicator variable equal to one if the target had a poison pill prior to when the outcome of the takeover 
attempt was determined.  Insider ownership figures represent the fractional ownership of officers and directors (taken from 
proxy statements).  Staggered board is an indicator variable equal to one if the target had a staggered board.  CEO 
compensation is the sum of the CEO's salary plus cash bonus for the year prior to the takeover announcement.  
CEO=Chairperson is an indicator variable equal to one if the target's CEO was also the chairperson of the Board.  Industry 
adjusted OIBD is the paired difference between operating income / assets for the sample firm and the median figure for 
firms within the same Fama-French 48 industry classification.  Stock return for prior year is the cumulative stock return 
over the year ending 20 days prior to the announcement date of the takeover attempt.  Industry-adjusted stock return is the 
difference between the firm’s stock return and the compounded value-weighted return for firms in the same Fama-French 
48 Industry classification over the year ending 20 days prior to the announcement date of the takeover attempt.   
 
  Initial prem. Prem. increase  Total premium 
  (a) (b)  (c) (d) 
  Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val.  Coeff. p-val. Coeff. p-val. 
 Intercept 0.330 0.015 -0.188 0.136  0.146 0.427 0.125 0.499 
 Log of equity market value -0.014 0.073 -0.002 0.738  -0.017 0.116 -0.017 0.120 
 Total liabilities / Assets 0.064 0.140 0.016 0.702  0.082 0.172 0.078 0.196 
 Market-to-book assets 0.012 0.311 0.001 0.925  0.013 0.432 0.012 0.446 
 Multiple bidders 0.000 0.987 0.178 0.000  0.179 0.000 0.179 0.000 
 Existing poison pill 0.042 0.033 0.050 0.010      
 Morning-after pill   0.097 0.000      
 Poison pill      0.105 0.000 0.133 0.007 
 Insider ownership -0.008 0.912 -0.018 0.799  -0.015 0.887 -0.027 0.797 
 Staggered board -0.022 0.233 0.016 0.348  -0.007 0.789 -0.009 0.721 
 Log of CEO compensation 0.012 0.330 0.022 0.051  0.033 0.044 0.034 0.039 
 Fraction of outside directors 0.027 0.587 0.020 0.659  0.045 0.500 0.042 0.535 
 CEO = Chairperson of board 0.005 0.804 0.011 0.520  0.016 0.534 0.017 0.529 
 Industry adjusted OIBD -0.142 0.152 -0.072 0.434  -0.219 0.108 -0.229 0.094 
 Stock return for prior year -0.090 0.015 -0.109 0.002  -0.198 0.000 -0.197 0.000 
 Industry-adj. stock return  -0.024 0.536 0.074 0.037  0.049 0.351 0.047 0.367 
 Delaware 0.019 0.425 -0.035 0.108  -0.018 0.587 -0.010 0.838 
 Post 1995 -0.027 0.362 -0.071 0.011  -0.099 0.015 -0.034 0.556 
 Delaware * Post 1995 -0.068 0.072 0.039 0.269  -0.029 0.582 -0.097 0.206 
 Poison Pill * Delaware        -0.018 0.777 
 Poison Pill * Post 1995        -0.125 0.119 
 Poison Pill * Del. * Post 1995        0.131 0.204 
           
 N  662  662   662  662 
 F-Statistic for Regression  3.46  9.24   7.68  6.61 
 Adjusted R2  0.056  0.175   0.139  0.139 
 
